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Beauty contest revisited – the effects of perceived attractiveness, competence and 
likability on the electoral success of German MPs 
Sebastian Jäckle, University of Freiburg 




We test the effects of physical appearance on electoral outcomes for the 2013 German 
national elections. We find that a candidate’s perceived attractiveness and to a lesser extent 
competence vis-á-vis his or her closest contestant increases chances of winning a direct 
mandate, while likability plays a minor role. Additionally we find the appearance effects to be 
conditioned by gender, age and incumbency status. Our study advances existing research in 
four ways: First, we capture relative differences in appearances, which resembles real-world 
situations more closely than absolute measures. Second, we proceed beyond a one-
dimensional assessment of appearance by simultaneously analysing attractiveness, 
competence, and likability, including interactions. Third, the central role of parties in the 
German mixed electoral system makes an especially tough test for appearance based effects. 




“What is beautiful is good” – at least for most of the time and most of the people. 
Writing over forty years ago, Dion, Berscheid and Walster (1972) for the first time provided 
evidence that beautiful people are “assumed to possess more socially desirable personality 
traits” and are “expected to lead better lives” (Dion et al. 1972, 285). Since then, a “beauty 
premium” as Praino and colleagues (2014, 1097) term it, has been detected in sociological, 
economic and psychological studies within virtually all fields of life. Attractive babies get 
more affectionate care by their mothers (Langlois et al. 1995), good-looking pupils receive 
better grades (Dukake et al. 2012) and are more likely to obtain a college degree (Gordon et 
al. 2014). Attractive persons have a better chance to get a call-back when applying for a job 
(Bóo et al. 2013), they get paid better (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994) and they do not have to 
deliver the same performance as their unattractive counterparts in sports (e.g. in soccer, see 
Rosar et al. 2010). Still, while beauty often pays, it can also have negative effects. For 
example, Johnson et al. (2010) show that attractiveness1 is detrimental for women applying 
for masculine sex-typed jobs in which appearance is of minor importance (e.g. prison 
warden). This interaction effect between gender and attractiveness has been termed the 
“beauty is beastly” effect (Heilman and Saruwatari 1979).  
In politics, several studies confirm the effects of physical attractiveness on the likelihood of 
being elected. Already in the mid-1970s, Efran and Patterson (1974, 354) found a significant 
correlation between beauty ratings of candidates and their vote share in Canadian federal 
elections. Subsequent studies added several controls (e.g. incumbency status) and confirmed a 
general effect of beauty in political systems as diverse as Australia, Finland, Brazil or Mexico 
                                                            
1 The terms “beauty” and “attractiveness” are used interchangeably throughout this article.  
(King and Leigh 2009; Berggren et al. 2010; Lawson et al. 2010) and also in Germany (Klein 
and Rosar 2005). The explanation why people seem to base their vote at least partly on 
candidates’ appearance is simple. During campaigns, pictures of the candidates are in most 
cases readily available (e.g. from campaign posters or newspapers). The electorate uses these 
pictures as “thin slices” (Ambady and Rosenthal 1992) of information about the contestants to 
infer personal traits relevant to them which they cannot readily learn about otherwise. When 
trying to infer these attributes, candidate appearances such as attractiveness are usually easy 
to assess. This creates a halo effect in which the easily available perception of beauty 
translates to other attributes and outshines other markers one might draw on. As a 
consequence, beauty regularly serves as a (subconscious) basis for inferring the trait of 
interest. In that sense, perceived beauty works as a heuristic which enables voters who do not 
know much (or anything) about the candidates – and thus could not make a well-founded 
choice – to gather enough information for deciding whom they want to vote for. However, 
voters may also resort to visual features when information relevant for a rational and 
deliberative decision – e.g. information given in a newspaper article about the candidate – is 
readily available (Barrett and Barrington 2005).2 
Obviously, other cues about candidates are available too, such as race, gender (McDermott 
2009), or party (e.g. Dancey and Sheagle 2013). Here, the decline in partisanship in most 
Western countries (Dalton 2000; Arzheimer 2006) has raised expectations that candidates – 
and, subsequently, their appearances – might become increasingly relevant for vote choice. 
                                                            
2 The usual perspective on heuristics is that they serve as a cheap but somewhat inaccurate alternative to the 
inefficient processing of large amounts of information. Yet, political psychologists have rejected this idea 
already in the late 1960s and contended that voters ignore more accurate information even if it was readily 
available. Quoting Sears, Bull and Hawkes (1982, 95) put this strikingly: “It is easier to base one’s decision on 
how a person looks rather than on the arguments he is putting forward.” Sears even took it one step further when 
he argued that “the primary purpose of raising issues at all may be simply to provide something for the candidate 
to talk about” (Sears 1969, 368). In his position it is therefore not primarily policy positions which candidates 
want to get into the newspapers, but their faces.  
Together with other aspects such as a growing media-focus on persons instead of parties, the 
possibility that individuals may themselves serve as cues for voters has led to the concern that 
politics could undergo a process of personalization. In such a situation, strong effects from 
candidate appearances would be a rather mixed blessing. While the literature for Germany so 
far agrees that although candidates in general do matter, support for a personalization is rather 
meagre and that candidate effects do not change much over time (Pappi and Shikano 2001; 
Ohr and Klein 2013), the picture is not yet complete since most work focuses on chancellor 
candidates, neglecting the level of constituencies. Here, work by Rosar and Klein (Rosar et al. 
2008; Klein and Rosar 2005) has already shown that sometimes substantial effects of physical 
attractiveness on electoral success exist. Yet, their work has so far mostly focused on 
attractiveness and not included other aspects of physical appearance such as perceived 
likability or inferred competence (but see Klein and Rosar 2005). Furthermore, although 
beauty is in part relative since the perception of attractiveness is affected by available 
alternatives (Kenrick and Gutierres 1980), studies on appearance effects in politics virtually 
all rely on absolute measures of candidate looks (modelling voter decision much akin to a jury 
in a beauty contest) instead of capturing attractiveness as a relative decision between two or 
more available candidates who do not exist independently of each other. 
The studies presented above have substantially contributed to our understanding of elections 
and electoral outcomes by complementing standard explanations of vote choice such as 
sociological theorizing, the social-psychological model of voting, and especially rational 
choice approaches. That heuristics based on candidates’ appearances may significantly affect 
voters’ decisions not only warrants scientific inquiry in itself but also raises both very 
practical issues and questions of broader democratic relevance. Indeed, if we accept that it is 
not solely one’s ideological position or one’s convincing arguments that help one to get 
elected, our understanding of (democratic) politics would appear incomplete without taking 
visual impressions into account, especially in a world that increasingly relies on (social) 
media with their heavy use of images for information. In this article, we contend that research 
on voting behaviour can only gain from more explicitly paying attention to the fact that 
voters’ choices are also affected by extra-political factors such as the superficial looks of 
candidates competing in a kind of “beauty contest”. At first, such a perspective may not only 
feel unfamiliar to political scientists given our usual theorizing based on e.g. ideological 
distance measures and rational choices, and indeed, it may even appear normatively 
undesirable. Yet, it is a factor nonetheless and the picture would just not be complete without 
it. As such it makes perfect sense to focus on the electoral effects of a candidate’s appearance. 
However, once we explore the role of facial traits, an obvious question is which trait it is that 
helps the most to get elected. With the existing literature disagreeing about this question – 
some say it is attractiveness while others are more inclined towards perceived competence – 
we take a neutral stance and test these two most often mentioned facial traits against each 
other. Furthermore, we introduce likability as a third type of perception that has been 
neglected in most studies so far and also test it against the other two (see next paragraph for a 
more thorough explanation of these three traits and existing studies on their effects on voting 
decisions). Our research is mostly exploratory, so we refrain from formulating explicit 
hypotheses which of the three traits matters most. Yet, we certainly assume that candidates’ 
appearance plays a significant and relevant role even compared to important explanatory 
factors such as the incumbency status. Additionally, if appearance matters, it is likely that it 
does not affect all candidates in the same way. Rather, we expect conditional effects between 
the facial traits and further characteristics of the candidate to be at work. Again, while existing 
studies have already indicated that different interactions may be relevant, a thorough test of 
these interactions is still lacking. We therefore chose three of the assumed conditioning 
factors most often mentioned and test whether they influence the appearance effects.  
To sum up, in this article we will join and extend the line of research presented above by (1) 
testing whether perceived attractiveness, competence or likability of direct candidates to the 
German Bundestag in the 2013 election can serve as relevant predictors for their electoral 
success and (if any) which trait matters most. Furthermore, we will (2) test whether these 
perceived appearance effects are conditioned by gender, incumbency and age.  
Preceding the main analysis our study additionally tests which features of the candidates’ 
faces, such as wearing a beard or glasses on the photos, impact on the perception of the three 
traits. In case one of the three traits emerges as a relevant determinant for the vote share, 
knowing which factors can help to boost this trait is certainly important for parties and 
candidates.     
2. A matter of beauty, competence or likability? 
While the general effect of candidates’ physical appearance on their chances to be elected by 
now is stably anchored, there are different ideas about the underlying causal relations. On the 
one hand, the studies referred to above argue for a “what is beautiful is good” halo effect. 
They regard attractiveness as a fundamental perception about a person which subsequently 
colours all kinds of ascribed attributes and therefore should ultimately also affect voters’ 
decisions. On the other hand, Todorov and colleagues (Todorov et al. 2005; Olivola and 
Todorov 2010) linked rapid, unreflected inferences of competence based on candidate 
pictures to election results of U.S. House and Senate races. According to them, attractiveness 
may matter to some degree for how competent voters judge a candidate (along with 
babyfacedness, familiarity and age [see Olivola and Todorov 2010, 92]), but in the end 
perceived competence is decisive. Expressed in terms of the social-psychological model of 
voting (Campbell et al. 1960), the difference between both perspectives is whether role-
related candidate attributes (i.e. competence) or more role-distant attributes (i.e. 
attractiveness) deliver the decisive momentum. 
Joining the line of Todorov et al., Armstrong and colleagues show that ratings of candidates’ 
“facial competence” were better predictors for “the popular vote winners in the presidential 
primaries and general election [than] […e]arly polling results” (Armstrong et al. 2010, 519). 
According to them, parties could actively increase their electoral chances in the same way that 
companies merchandize their products by using an attractive packaging. Another study 
suggests that this is already done, particularly in competitive electoral districts: Challengers 
sent to “tossup” districts in U.S. House and Senate races have significantly higher facial 
competence scores than challengers in electorally safe districts (Atkinson et al. 2009, 233). 
Ballew and Todorov (2007) demonstrate that even very short exposures (100ms) to facial 
pictures of both candidates in a gubernatorial race suffice to predict the winner by asking who 
appears more competent.  
Studies testing both – perceived attractiveness and competence – are scarce and so far have 
come to no consistent result. While Berggren et al. conclude that at least for Finnish non-
incumbent candidates “beauty is more strongly correlated with success than […] perceived 
competence” (2010, 8), Olivola and Todorov arrive at a contrary result (2010, 95).  
Additionally to attractiveness and competence, we test for likability as a third, role-unrelated 
predictor which so far has been treated as a stepchild in appearance studies. While likability 
has mostly been examined for the U.S. after Wattenberg (1992) depicted “the rise of 
candidate-centered politics” (see Bishin et al. 2006) one shortcoming of most studies is that 
they only focus on well-known politicians. Yet, if people already follow their gut feelings 
when assessing well-known politicians like U.S. presidential candidates (where information is 
easily available), likability should play an even greater role when voters are less familiar with 
the candidates. Additionally, appearance studies usually consider likability as a further control 
at best, failing to elaborate potential interactions. Thus, it comes as no surprise that these 
studies find only little, if any, evidence of an independent likability-effect: For example, 
Berggren and colleagues find no additional effect of likability when controlling for beauty, 
arguing that both assessments are collinear (Berggren et al. 2010, 14). However, Rule and 
colleagues (2010) have shown that a perceived factor “power” (but not “warmth”) was 
predictive for the electoral success of U.S. senators while for the Japanese diet the effects 
were reversed. Given that “warmth” contained perceived likability, the apparent underlying 
cultural variation of the effect cautions against dismissing likability for Germany based 
mostly on negative findings from the U.S. At the level of constituencies, no study has tested 
for likability so far. Analysing the effects of likability appears all the more important given 
that Olivola and Todorov find that likability has an effect on hypothetical but not on actual 
votes which could “suggest that experiments limited to the laboratory may overestimate the 
role of these inferences [judgements related to likability] in predicting real life outcomes” 
(Olivola and Todorov 2010, 94). We therefore include likability to test systematically whether 
and when it has an additional effect compared to attractiveness and competence at the level of 
constituencies. 
Summing up, this leads to our first research question: 
 Q1: To what extent do perceived attractiveness, competence and likability impact on 
the election results for direct candidates to the German Bundestag? And which of these traits 
is most important? 
Regarding the second part of this question Praino et al. (2014) have argued that at least with 
respect to attractiveness and competence there is no simple answer. They found that whether 
competence or attractiveness is more important depends on the configuration of the 
contestants regarding their gender: competence is more important for inter-gender races while 
in intra-gender races, it is attractiveness because 
“[b]etween two men or two women, it is fairly easy to determine with a glance who is more 
attractive than the other; when comparing a man with a woman, however such assessment becomes 
much trickier, even at times impossible. […] Voters tend to be easily influenced by good-looking 
candidates when it is easy for them to choose which candidate looks best. When such assessment 
becomes more complicated, voters end up choosing the second easiest path, that is, they determine 
who appears to be more competent” (Praino et al. 2014, 1111).  
Different studies suggest that the effects of appearance, particularly of attractiveness are 
conditioned by other interactions:   
a) Male candidates seem to benefit more from beauty than females, probably because 
physical attractiveness may also carry negative connotations particularly for women 
(the “dumb blonde syndrome” [King and Leigh 2009, 591]).  
b) Attractiveness has a stronger effect on challengers than on incumbents, probably 
because voters know more about incumbents already and therefore need to resort less 
to thin slices of information on their physical characteristics for arriving at a decision 
(King and Leigh 2009, 592).  
c) With attractiveness being correlated strongly with youth it can be argued that 
particularly in races where a young candidate competes against an old candidate, 
attractiveness should play a more relevant role (see e.g. McLellan and McKelvie 
1993). 
These points lead to our second research question: 
Q2: To what extent are the effects of the three appearance traits conditioned by (a) the 
gender of the candidate, and (b) the configuration of candidates within the electoral district 
regarding gender, age and incumbency status. 
 
3. Research Design 
This section introduces our research design. After explaining why German federal elections 
provide a good setting for analysing appearance effects, we describe how we measured 
perceived attractiveness, competence and likability with an online survey. The third 
subsection explores which features in the pictures foster the perception of the three traits. We 
then describe our weighting procedure for ambiguity in the ratings based on latency times 
before subsection five describes our dependent variable and the controls. 
3.1.Testing appearance based effects in elections to the German Bundestag  
Many studies of the effects of perceived appearance focus on the United States where 
personalization is comparatively strong and parties relatively weak, making it likely to find 
appearance effects. If, however, a “beauty premium” is universal, we should also find it in a 
country where the role of parties is stronger and politics are less personalized. Germany is 
well suited for such a test since it has strong and disciplined parties which are the main focal 
points for voting decisions. Furthermore, it is large enough (in terms of electoral 
districts/candidates) to allow for a meaningful statistical analysis. While personalization has 
somewhat increased during the last decades in Germany, it is still low compared to the US, 
and most studies find its effects to be limited to top-politicians such as party leaders and 
chancellor candidates (Kaase 1994; Pappi and Shikano 2001; Brettschneider 2002). 
Furthermore, party identification is still strong in Germany and has a bigger influence on the 
final voting decision than in the US presidential system (Berglund et al. 2005, 105-106). Most 
students of German politics would therefore agree that it is still the parties and not candidates 
which shape federal elections.  
Although the German electoral system is in the end a PR system, one of the two votes 
(Erststimme or “first vote”) is given to a candidate (and not to a party). Thus, in each of the 
299 electoral districts there is a competition not only between the parties, but also between so 
called “direct candidates”. Due to the structure of the German party system, in most districts 
only candidates from the conservative Christian-Democratic Union CDU (or its sister party 
CSU in the state of Bavaria) or Social Democratic SPD have realistic chances to get elected.3 
Apart from the parties’ front-runners, election campaigns within the districts are also focused 
on the respective direct candidates to a substantial degree. In practice this means that several 
weeks before the election the streets are full with election posters showing images of the 
candidates. We can therefore safely assume that, at least for the major parties, voters know 
how the candidates look like.  
3.2.Measuring perceived attractiveness, competence and likability 
For each electoral district we collected photographs of the two candidates who won most 
votes in that district at the 2013 general elections. In most cases we used photos from the 
candidates’ official websites. Sometimes we also resorted to the Bundestag’s or a 
parliamentary party group’s homepage, or to newspapers. We strived to collect pictures that 
resembled those used in election campaigns as much as possible since it is these pictures that 
voters will most probably have in mind. Therefore, if a candidate’s appearance has any effect, 
it should be based on the pictures the public has access to. The pictures we used all showed 
the candidate’s complete face, and usually included the shoulders. Presenting not only the 
facial expression (we excluded pictures where candidates showed strong facial expressions 
like wide smiles), but also hairstyle, clothing and jewelry makes sense because these non-
facial aspects of the picture have shown to be at least equally important as the sole 
physiognomy (Spezio et al. 2012). We selected photos without distracting backgrounds, 
scaled them to the same size and transformed them to grey-scale. To prevent raters from 
associating the pictures with certain parties all party symbols were removed (e.g. lapel pins).  
                                                            
3 In East German constituencies, socialist LINKE are also often on a level with CDU and SPD. The GREEN 
party also has some strongholds, particularly in larger cities, where they possess somehow realistic chances to 
win a direct constituency seat. 
In our online survey we showed each rater 25 pairs of candidates, each pair representing one 
electoral district. Raters were asked to indicate which of the two persons they deemed to be 
more attractive, competent and likable.4 Our measurement thus differs from absolute ratings. 
The idea of comparing only the two main alternatives draws on the observation by Kenrick 
and Gutierres (1980) who showed that subjects rated a person as comparatively less attractive 
after having seen pictures of beautiful people – apparently, when it comes to appearances, 
alternatives do matter. We therefore expect our approach to reproduce the situation in an 
electoral district more faithfully. First, real-life voters are probably unaware of the looks of 
most candidates outside their district. Thus presenting raters with alternatives that may affect 
their rating but that real-life voters probably never see may at best add noise. Instead, 
constraining measurement to alternatives effectively available to voters should minimize 
differences between voters and raters. Second, virtually all models of choice reason 
comparatively by assuming that an option is not picked because of its absolute merit but 
rather because it is the best (or closest) available alternative. Any effects of perceived 
personal traits should thus be based on the relative advantages or disadvantages a candidate 
has compared to his or her contestant within the electoral district. And third, to the extent that 
rating appearances is a matter of cognitive effort, a relative model is more parsimonious since 
it avoids an absolute standard of reference. Our measurement takes these points into account 
and follows the suggestions by Ballew and Todorov (2007) as well as by King and Leigh 
(2009) who also have stressed the importance of measuring perceived traits in a relative way. 
While relative judgments may be more accurate, our measurement is, of course, no silver 
bullet since rating only the two main candidates leaves open the possibility that a third 
                                                            
4 With our study being interested in the perception of the candidates appearance it was not necessary to define 
the three traits in more detail. Every rater had the possibility of applying his or her own understanding of 
attractiveness, competence and likability. In the end we define the three traits by using the empirical data. I.e. a 
person is more attractive (competent/likable) compared to his or her contestant if raters had chosen him or her 
more often as the more attractive (competent/likable) candidate.     
candidate might also affect voters’ assessments. However, the problem is probably not overly 
severe: First, it is usually the two top candidates that set the stage for the contest since only 
they have – at least in most cases – realistic chances of winning.5 And second, even if effects 
from a missing third candidate enter real-life judgments, there is no reason to assume that the 
effects are systematic and thus more than noise. 
All studies on the effects of personal traits face a common problem: When raters recognize 
the candidates, their ratings might no longer rely on appearance alone but also depend on the 
candidate’s person or party. Different strategies have been adopted as solutions (see Praino et 
al. 2014, 1102). Little and colleagues (2007) use only the shapes of the candidates’ faces 
which makes it impossible for participants to identify whom they rate. Others manipulate the 
photos to achieve the same effect (Armstrong et al., 2010; Todorov et al., 2005). Both 
approaches are not helpful for our purpose since they undermine the idea of rating candidates 
based on publicly used pictures. A third strategy is to make plausible that raters do not know 
the candidates. For this purpose Lawson and his colleagues (2010) draw on US-American and 
Indian students to rate politicians from Mexico and Brazil. Antonakis and Dalgas (2009) 
present children and adults from Switzerland with photographs of candidates for the French 
National Assembly. Asked which person they would prefer as a captain on a boat journey the 
children’s answers were as good as the adult’s in predicting who actually won in the election.  
We take a different, two-stage approach. First, we excluded well-known politicians from the 
sample with a pre-test.6 Removing these individuals is both a precondition for obtaining 
                                                            
5 In more than 90 per cent of the electoral districts, the party with the second most first votes has a lead of at least 
five percentage points over the third-placed party. Concentrating on the two strongest parties in each district is 
therefore justifiable in most cases.  
6 In this pre-test, eleven students from the University of Heidelberg and six from the University of Freiburg took 
part in an online survey in which they indicated for each of the 598 candidates whether they recognized or were 
able to associate him or her with a party. We excluded an electoral district if more than two pre-testers 
recognized one or both candidates. The pre-testers did not participate in the main survey. 
ratings based on the presented photos alone and can also be justified with respect to the 
underlying voter model: For well-known politicians (e.g. chancellor Angela Merkel), voters 
can draw on much more information than for the average candidate, requiring them to rely 
less on information shortcuts, subsequently decreasing appearance based effects. On the basis 
of the pre-test we excluded 40 of the 299 electoral districts. As a second step to assure 
unbiased ratings, we also asked the raters at the end of the main survey whether they had 
recognized a person and whether they knew his or her name. Districts in which a rater 
recognized a candidate were then excluded from the analysis for that rater.7  
  
                                                            
7 Of the 11,262 pairs of candidates presented, participants recognized a politician in only 48 instances. These 
instances involved 31 different politicians in total which implies that no politician was recognized 
systematically, suggesting that the pre-test worked as intended.    
Figure 1: Screenshot of Online Rating Tool 
 
Raters were unaware that they rated politicians. Instead, they were given a cover story 
emphasizing that they participated in a survey about the correlation between appearance and 
social cooperation.8 Candidate pairs presented were chosen randomly from the entirety of all 
259 included constituencies.9 We randomized which candidate appeared on the left/right half 
of the screen and (across raters) the ordering of buttons for rating. A screenshot of the rating 
tool can be seen in figure 1.  
                                                            
8 Nevertheless, even if they did not know the persons, it can not be completely ruled out that participants realized 
that they in fact rated politicians, as the pictures clearly resemble headshots of politicians like those often visible 
in public.    
9 This makes a total of 518 candidates for whom we collected the pictures. 364 of them were male and 154 
female. In 123 districts two male candidates ran against each other, in 18 districts it was two females and in 118 
a man ran against a woman. In addition, male candidates have a more than two and a half times higher chance of 
winning when they compete against a female candidate (85 to 33). The average candidate was born in 1963 and 
thus was 50 years old in the election year. Ten candidates had a migration background (most of them were of 
Turkish descent). Yet, for none of them the greyscale pictures allowed to trace back their non-German descent in 
comparison to the candidates with no migration background. A systematic racial bias can therefore be ruled out.    
Each rater was presented 25 pairs of pictures. While other studies had participants rate up to 
several hundred pairs (see e.g. Atkinson et al. 2009, 232), we chose this relatively small 
number to help raters remain concentrated. Furthermore, with only 25 rated pairs of 
candidates, raters should be less likely to develop systematic response patterns which could 
bias the results. Each pair was shown for ten seconds. A visually prominent countdown 
indicated how much time was left to click. When time was over or the participant had clicked 
the third item, there was a one second blank screen before the next pair of pictures was 
presented. In total, 449 student raters completed the survey.10 On average each electoral 
district was presented to 43.48 (sd = 6.55) raters. For attractiveness, the mean number of 
ratings for each pair of candidates is 38.56 (sd = 6.21; min = 23; max = 61), for competence it 
is 40.00 (sd = 6.30; min = 22; max = 62) and for likability it is 40.52 (sd = 6.37; min = 24; 
max = 63) respectively. All ratings are thus based on a sufficiently large sample according to 
the truth of consensus method (Patzer 1985) which holds that already a much smaller number 
of raters produces an accurate measurement of attractiveness. For example, King and Leigh 
(2009) found that as few as four raters may already lead to a stable attractiveness result. 
Before the survey, participants were explicitly instructed to base their rating solely on their 
very first impression and their gut feeling. According to Ballew and Todorov (2007, 17948), 
                                                            
10 Student raters are clearly no representative sample of the voting population in Germany. It is therefore possible 
that the students rate the appearance of the politicians in a different way than the average voter would do. Due to 
practical reasons there is nevertheless no good alternative to student raters. For recruiting the students were 
directly approached during several lectures and asked to participate. We sent every one of these students an 
email (plus a follow-up mail one week later) including a unique token that allowed a single rater to complete the 
survey only once. In order to keep the potential bias from student raters low, we used two different student 
populations from two universities. At the University of Freiburg (Baden-Wuerttemberg) 259 political science 
students and at the University of Passau (Bavaria) 191 students from communication and cultural studies 
completed the survey. Albeit the two student populations clearly differed with regard to their academic, 
geographic and socio-demographic base, the appearance ratings were largely similar (see online appendix O1). 
This finding suggests that the relative appearance ratings we use in our study are largely stable among raters 
from different backgrounds. Furthermore, Rosar (2009, 760) rightfully noticed, that even if student raters 
systematically differ in their ratings compared to the voting population, this would only mean to be a tougher test 
for the analysis of appearance effects in voting decisions.  
“rapid and unreflected face judgements” do a better job at predicting the electoral outcome 
than if the participants are asked to make a deliberated decision and “think carefully about 
their choice”. Furthermore, Bar et al. (2006) showed “that consistent first impressions can be 
formed very quickly” (only 39 ms were needed to form a first impression). Our countdown 
was chosen to support such a quick decision. According to feedback from our pre-testers, ten 
seconds worked well to allow for comparing the pictures while upholding sufficient pressure 
to prevent loitering. Additionally, we measured not only who of the two candidates was 
deemed to be more attractive, competent, and likable, but also – with an accuracy of 10 ms – 
how long a participant needed to click the respective button. We use these latency times as a 
measure of ambiguity (see section 3.4). 
3.3. Apparent properties of the faces influencing the perception of the three traits 
As a first step preceding the main analysis, we test which properties of the candidates’ facial 
pictures are adjuvant for being rated as the more attractive, competent or likable of the two 
presented candidates.11 We estimate nine different logistic models:  each trait (attractiveness, 
competence and likability), in each of the three district types (male-vs.-male, female-vs.-
female and female-vs.-male races). Figure 2 presents the results. Most of them are fairly 
expectable: Age has a negative effect on attractiveness in all models, while it has a positive 
effect on competence, particularly in races with two male candidates. Its effect on likability is 
much smaller. Glasses tend to make people appear more competent while negatively 
impacting the other two traits (except for its positive effect on likability in female-vs.-male 
races. Wearing a beard by trend, reduces the perceived competence of the candidate while it 
increases the probability to be seen as the more attractive and particularly the more likable 
person. Wearing a suit or a blazer helps in female-vs.-female races as well as in female-vs.-
                                                            
11 For this analysis we concentrate on properties of the candidates’ faces which are either easily identifiable and 
measureable or which could at least in theory be changed by the candidate. Thus, we test the effects of gender, 
wearing glasses or jewelry, but not of facial symmetry.  
male races to be perceived as the more competent person, while in male-vs.-male races there 
is no significant effect. This might of course be due to the small number of male candidates 
wearing no suit (only 13 out of 364). In female-vs.-male races a short hairstyle for women 
(virtually all men had short hair) is detrimental to all three traits, while compared to a second 
female candidate a woman with a short hair style is only perceived as less attractive. For men, 
a bald head strongly depresses attractiveness, and to a lesser extent also likability but in male-
vs.-male races it helps to be perceived as the more competent candidate. The only significant 
effect of jewelry is probably an unintended one: Wearing jewelry reduces the chances to be 
rated as the more attractive person in female-vs.-male races. One of the strongest effects can 
be found for sex of the candidate – in female-vs.-male races men are much less likely to be 
rated as more attractive or likable than women, but there is no difference in perceived 
competence.  
These findings clearly show that several properties in a picture can shape our perception of a 
person (sometimes conditioned by gender of the contestants). Furthermore, we tested whether 
the results presented above differ systematically for male and female raters. This was not the 
case – there were virtually no differences between the ratings of female and male raters (see 
figure O2 in the online appendix). It is therefore not necessary to weight the ratings according 
to the percentage of male/female raters.  
 
  
Figure 2: Binary Logit: Determinants of Perceived Attractiveness, Competence, and 
Likability 
 
3.4. Ambiguity in the ratings 
So far, we have treated all ratings as similar. Each click had the same weight. Yet, it may 
sometimes be difficult to decide who is more attractive, likable, or competent – i.e. ratings 
may range from clear-cut to hard-to-decide and ambiguous. This makes the raw ratings 
difficult to interpret, in particular if a large portion of the raters had trouble to decide. For 
CATI-research, Bassili argues that “opinions that are expressed quickly are usually more 
strongly associated with established evaluations” or “are usually more free of conflict than 
opinions that are expressed slowly” (Bassili 2000, 4). This idea can be adapted to our context: 
Assuming that raters in doubt require more time to decide, we can use latency times until 
click as a proxy for ambiguity in the decision which candidate is more attractive (competent, 
or likable). Furthermore, the most pronounced form of ambiguity can be assumed if a rater 
does not click a button at all. In that case he or she could not decide between the candidates, 
similar to a 50/50-chance to click one of them. Taking these points together, there are three 
forms of how a high ambiguity should show up in the data: (1) a high number of non-clicks 
for an electoral district; (2) an equal distribution of clicks across both candidates; (3) a long 
average time until the button was clicked. For attractiveness, bivariate analysis shows that 
while all three variables exhibit substantial variation, they are substantially correlated (r = .37 
to .56), suggesting that they present a common underlying ambiguity.12 According to this 
finding it makes sense to weight the ratings with respect to latency times in order to account 
for ambiguity. Of course, raters are different regarding their overall clicking-speed. For this 
reason we centre the latency-times on the rater specific minimal and maximal latency-times 
for each trait. The fastest click of each rater is assigned a weighting factor of 1.0 while the 
slowest click gets a weight of .2 (this reflects the assumption that clicking one of the 
candidates even after a relatively long latency-time does not reflect complete ambiguity on 
behalf of the rater).13  
In order to test to what extent the three traits are related in the raters’ perception we correlated 
the weighted scores for the winning candidates of all electoral districts. The results show only 
a medium strong relation (r =.53) between attractiveness and likability while the other two 
correlations between competence and attractiveness and competence and likability are below r 
= .03. The three traits can therefore be seen as relatively independent from each other.  
3.5.Dependent variable and controls 
                                                            
12 For the other two traits, likability and competence, the correlations are weaker but still present (see replication 
file).  








 with: 𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋 =  number of ratings in district 𝑋𝑋;  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋 =  weight for rating 𝑖𝑖 in district 𝑋𝑋. 
𝑟𝑟(𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋 = rating 𝑖𝑖 for candidate 𝐴𝐴 in district 𝑋𝑋 (i.e. 0 or 1);  
To analyse the effects of perceived attractiveness, competence, and likability on the 
performance of direct candidates at the 2013 general election, we estimate OLS regressions. 
Please note that since our research strategy involves a relative assessment of the three traits (= 
weighted proportion of clicks for the winning candidate compared to the runner up), this 
relativity also has to be reflected in the dependent variable. We therefore construct the 
dependent variable as the difference between the vote share of the winning candidate and the 
vote share of the runner-up. Taking a look at this variable shows that on average, the winning 
candidate had a lead of 17 percentage points, while the maximum difference between the 
winner and the runner-up was 51.4 percentage points.  
In addition to the variables that measure perceived appearance, we control for a number of 
factors characterizing the electoral district: turnout, incumbency status14 and gender of the 
candidates15, share of second votes (i.e. votes for the party), percentage of male citizens, 
proportion of senior to youth citizens, economic situation (measured via unemployment rate, 
business tax revenues, and the balance of business registrations and de-registrations) and 
whether the district was expected to be contested before the 2013 election.16 Furthermore, we 
control for candidates holding a doctorate, as studies have shown a positive effect of an 
academic title in German elections (Schneider and Tepe 2011; Manow and Flemming 2011). 
Again, all controls regarding the contestants are constructed to reflect the relation between 
                                                            
14 We use two different operationalizations for incumbency. The first operationalization (incumbency_direct) 
only counts those canddiates as incumbents who had won the most first votes in 2009 and thus held a „direct 
mandate“ in the legislative term 2009-2013. The second operationalization (incumbency_BT) relaxes this 
requirement to all candidates who had been a member of the Bundestag between 2009 and 2013 regardless 
whether they had a „direct mandate“ or a „list mandate“.    
15 Gender of the electoral race is operationalized using four dummies: male/male; male/female; female/female; 
female/male (winner/runner up). 
16 This dummy variable was derived from a large inquiry by Spiegel Online (the largest German online news 
outlet) made for each electoral district as part of their press coverage before the 2013 elections. Districts were 
marked as contested in light of the 2009 results for first votes and specific case knowledge about issues and 
events which happened in the district during the interelection period. A map of the marked districts is available 
at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundestagswahl-wackel-wahlkreise-2013-a-916641.html  
them, not absolute values (e.g. “second votes” is the difference between the vote share of the 
party of the winning candidate and the party of the runner up). All variables used in the 
regressions therefore measure at the level of the electoral district. Table O3 in the online 
appendix gives an overview of all variables, their operationalization and sources.   
Following our second research questions, we also test interactions between the three 
perceived appearance variables and the configuration of the electoral race in terms of gender, 
incumbency and age. 
4. Results 
4.1.  Main effect models 
In a first step we estimate main effects models (see table 1). Models 1 and 3 differ by how we 
measure incumbency. In model 1 only those candidates who had won the first vote in 2009 
are regarded as incumbents, yielding three possibilities: a) winner is incumbent (reference 
category), b) runner up is incumbent, and c) none of the candidates won the first vote in 2009. 
In model 3 the incumbency definition is relaxed to cover all candidates that had been 
members of the Bundestag between 2009 and 2013 (hence four dummies can be created). 
Model 2 (4) replicates model 1 (3) using a stepwise procedure.  
Generally speaking, the explained variance is high and results are consistent across the 
models.17 Regarding perceived attractiveness, competence and likability there is a clear 
finding: Being seen as attractive and, to a lesser extent as competent helps the candidate while 
likability does not have a significant effect. Since the dependent variable is the difference in 
the first votes between winner and runner up, the coefficients have to be interpreted as 
                                                            
17 Tests of multicollinearity showed no major problems (max. VIF = 5.1). According to Breusch-Pagan tests, 
models 1 and 2 exhibit some heteroscedasticity. Therefore, these models are estimated with robust standard 
errors. Excluding influential observations (Cook’s distance > 4/N) does not alter the effects significantly (see 
table O4 in the online appendix). The results in table 1 can therefore be regarded as robust. 
follows: A change in perceived attractiveness from 0 to 1 (i.e. from no one rating the winner 
as more attractive to 100% rating the winner as the more attractive candidate) increases the 
distance in the first votes between the winner and the runner up by 2.403 percentage points 
(model 1). For competence, the effect is slightly weaker and only significant in the stepwise 
models. The main effect models clearly show that physical appearance in terms of perceived 
attractiveness (and competence) has significant effects on the vote shares for direct candidates 
even when controlling for other relevant factors such as incumbency or the percentage of 
second votes for the winning candidate’s party (which is by far the strongest predictor when 
interpreting the betas see table O5 in the online appendix). Likability only becomes 
significant when attractiveness is omitted. 
Gender plays a minor role: only in female-vs.-male races, the difference between the winner 
and the runner up (regardless whether the woman or the man wins) is slightly larger than in 
the reference category of female-vs.-female districts. The other controls show that in electoral 
districts with a high share of senior-to-youth citizens, the difference between the winner and 
the runner up decreases. The same applies to those districts that had a priori been classified as 
contested. Interestingly, the difference in age of the candidates is only slightly significant in 
models 1 and 2. By trend, the older the winning candidate is compared to the runner up, the 
smaller is her lead. The following interaction models investigate this result further. 
 
  
Table 1: Main effects models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  (stepwise)  (stepwise) 
     
Perceived physical appearance     
Attractiveness 2.403*** 2.185*** 2.711*** 3.351*** 
 (0.795) (0.612) (0.904) (0.696) 
Competence 1.475 2.061** 2.156*  
 (1.098) (0.949) (1.253)  
Likability 0.883  0.872  
 (0.928)  (1.087)  
Incumbency dummies     
Incumbency_BT (only runner up) -4.688*** -4.442***   
 (0.818) (0.785)   
Incumbency_BT (both cand.) -2.531*** -2.576***   
 (0.488) (0.479)   
Incumbency_BT (none of the cand.) -2.275*** -2.067***   
 (0.502) (0.479)   
Incumbency_direct (runner up)   -3.832*** -3.773*** 
   (0.798) (0.778) 
Incumbency_direct (none of the cand.)   -1.908*** -1.699*** 
   (0.502) (0.467) 
Gender dummies     
Winner: male & Runner up: male 1.139  1.189  
 (0.860)  (0.820)  
Winner: male & Runner up: female 1.589  1.785* 0.873** 
 (0.966)  (0.907) (0.438) 
Winner: female & Runner up: male 1.349  1.665*  
 (0.927)  (0.916)  
Controls 1.139  1.189  
Age difference  -0.0324* -0.0350** -0.0199  
 (0.0173) (0.0161) (0.0183)  
Doctorate 0.275  0.0864  
 (0.330)  (0.399)  
Contested electoral district -2.495*** -2.552*** -2.455*** -2.303*** 
 (0.589) (0.546) (0.514) (0.493) 
Second votes 2013 0.975*** 0.981*** 0.973*** 0.981*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0198) (0.0236) (0.0179) 
Turnout -0.103*  -0.110  
 (0.0587)  (0.0678)  
Business tax revenues (in 1000 Euro per capita) 0.276  0.255  
 (0.697)  (0.855)  
Business registrations/deregistrations (per 1000 persons) -0.0515  -0.0222  
 (0.184)  (0.190)  
Unemployment rate -0.0718  -0.0742  
 (0.0995)  (0.108)  
Percentage male population -0.528  -0.539  
 (0.339)  (0.348)  
Senior-to-youth-rate -1.910 -1.608* -2.555** -2.005** 
 (1.241) (0.858) (1.271) (0.896) 
Constant 35.99* 3.273*** 36.43* 3.167*** 
 (19.59) (1.158) (20.08) (1.185) 
     
Observations 259 259 259 259 
R-squared 0.947 0.945 0.941 0.938 
Standard errors in parentheses (Models 1 and 1 with robust standard errors due to heteroscedasticity) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.2. Interaction models 
All interaction models are based on the main effects model 1. The interactions were tested in 
separate models. Table 2 gives an overview of all significant interactions. The complete 
models can be found in table O6 in the online appendix. For interactions with the metric 
variable “age difference”, significance is assumed if there is a marginal effect significantly 
different from 0 at some point within the range between the empirical minimum and 
maximum of age difference (-30 to 30). Figures 3 and 4 present the two significant 
interactions with the incumbency dummy and the one between gender and likability using 
predicted value plots. The interactions with “age difference” are presented as marginal effect 
plots in figure 5. 
Table 2: Overview of all significant interactions 
 Attractiveness Competence Likability 
Incumbency_BT    
Winner 0 0 0 









Gender    
Female vs. female 0 0 + 
Male vs. male 0 0 0 
Female vs. male 0 0 0 
Male vs. female 0 0 0 
Age difference - 0 0 
+: positive interaction effect, -: negative interaction effect, 0: no significant interaction 
 
 
The interaction between incumbency and attractiveness shows the expected effect: Only when 
the 2013 runner up had been a member of the Bundestag in 2009, attractiveness plays a major 
role. This means that attractiveness is more important for candidates who were new to the 
contest in 2013 and did not have the incumbency advantage. The three other incumbency 
dummies “only winner is incumbent”, “no one of the candidates is incumbent” and “both 
candidates had been members of the Bundestag” show no significant interaction effect.18 
While for competence there is no significant interaction with incumbency status, figure 3b 
shows that likability becomes relevant in cases where both candidates had been members of 
the Bundestag before.19   
Figure 3: Interactions between Incumbency_BT and Attractiveness (a)/Likability (b) 
(Predicted Values) 
 
The third significant interaction effect is between gender and likability. Likability does not 
show any effect in districts where two male candidates compete or where a woman competes 
against a man (regardless whether the woman is winner or runner up), but when female 
candidates compete, likability becomes a relevant factor.20 At this point, we can only 
speculate why likability seems to work as a separate dimension for women, but not for men. 
Yet, the expectation that male and female candidates would generally profit to a different 
                                                            
18 In order to increase readability the interactions for “no one” and “both candidates are incumbents” have been 
omitted from the figure. This interaction line is not presented in figure 5 to increase the readability of the plot. It 
has nearly the same position as the line for “winner is incumbent“.     
19 Again the two other non significant interactions („runner up is incumbent“  and „no one is incumbent“) have 
been omitted in order to increase readability 
20 Again figure 6 only presents the interaction line for male vs. male districts. The lines for female-vs.-male and 
male-vs.-female districts differ only marginally from that line. 
extent from their physical appearance has to be denied. Neither the strong effect of 
attractiveness nor the weaker one for perceived competence is conditioned by the candidates 
gender.    
Figure 4: Interaction between Gender and Likability (Predicted Values) 
 
The last interaction tested is between the age difference of winner and runner up and the three 
traits. The marginal effect plots indicate that there are significant interactions when the 
winning candidate is younger than his or her contestant. We find the strongest effect between 
age and attractiveness. This means that for comparatively young candidates attractiveness 
plays a larger role than for their older opponents. For a winning candidate who is 20 years 
younger than the runner up an increase in the attractiveness score from 0 to 1 would mean a 
rise in the difference between the first vote shares of the two by about 3.5 percentage points. 
If both candidates have the same age, the attractiveness coefficient drops to 2.0, and if the 
runner up is 10 years younger than the winner, there is no significant attractiveness advantage 
detectable any longer. For competence as well as for likability the interactions show the same 
trend, yet they fall short of significance.      
 
Figure 5: Interactions between Age Difference and (a) Attractiveness, (b) Competence, 




5. Summary and discussion 
5.1 Summary of the results 
We began this article with the two questions whether perceived attractiveness, competence or 
likability of direct candidates to the German Bundestag can serve as relevant predictors for 
their electoral success (which of these traits matters most), and whether potential appearance 
effects may be conditioned by incumbency status, gender and age of the candidates.  
To answer these questions, we conducted an online survey among 449 students from different 
academic and geographic backgrounds. They indicated for all the 259 electoral districts where 
no well-known candidate competed, whether in their view the winner of the first vote in the 
2013 general elections appeared as being more attractive, more competent and more likable 
than the runner up. The raters did not know that they were rating politicians. Using latency 
times as an indicator of ambiguity, we aggregated the ratings at district level to form a 
measure of the perceived attractiveness, competence and likability of the winning candidate 
relative to the second placed. This relative measurement is more faithful to the situation in a 
district (voters will compare available candidates instead of judging them in the way a jury in 
a beauty contest would) and distinguishes our article from other approaches which measure 
perceived beauty (or other traits) in an absolute way.  
Prior to the main analysis we tested which apparent features of the candidates’ pictures are 
positively correlated with being perceived as more attractive, competent or likable. Most of 
the effects we find are very plausible: Young persons have better odds to be rated as being 
more attractive, while wearing glasses boosts competence and having a beard makes the 
candidate likable, to name but a few. Yet, these findings would be quite irrelevant from a 
political science point of view if the three appearance based traits had no impact on the 
election results. 
Using the difference between the first vote shares of the winner and the second placed 
candidate as dependent variable, we find that attractiveness, and to a lesser extent 
competence, both positively affect the vote share. Likability, in contrast, shows no significant 
effect. These results are robust to controlling for potentially relevant factors such as different 
kinds of incumbency, age and gender of the candidates, turnout, economic situation within the 
electoral district and even the share of second votes which has by far the largest effect. In 
total, our model explains more than 94% of the variance. 
Relating our findings back to the literature, our results neither fully support the idea of 
Todorov and colleagues that competence wins out nor the idea of Berggren and colleagues 
that attractiveness is the only relevant factor. Rather, both attributes seem to work 
independently of each other and their effects add up – yet, the effect of perceived 
attractiveness is stronger and always significant, whereas the competence effect is weaker and 
falls short of significance in some models. Our study thus lends additional support to the idea 
of a beauty premium, even under tough conditions, but also shows that candidates are not just 
evaluated on the basis of attractiveness alone. Rather competence as a factor more closely 
related to their role as politicians also plays a part, even if it may merely be inferred from a 
photograph. According to our findings, when parties want to toss up a contested district, they 
should send a candidate that is both good and competent looking.  
In the second part of the main analysis we tested whether the appearance effects are 
conditioned by gender, incumbency and age as suggested by earlier studies. Indeed, we find 
some significant interactions. Attractiveness plays a stronger role for those candidates who do 
not have the incumbency advantage. This makes sense insofar, as voters can rely on other 
information when making up their mind about incumbents (they probably know more about 
them), but they have to hark back to other possibilities for judging challengers, and 
attractiveness seems to work well in that case. This result is in line with earlier work (King 
and Leigh 2009). Yet, our models do not corroborate results from Praino and colleagues 
(2014) who assume that competence is more important for inter-gender races while in intra-
gender races it is attractiveness. Both traits show consistently positive effects on the first vote 
share, regardless of the gender of the candidates. We find the only significant interaction 
between one of the appearance variables and gender between all-female districts and 
likability. This means that while in general likability shows no significant effect, at least as 
long as attractiveness is controlled for, looking likable helps a female candidate when 
competing against another woman. The final interactions that we tested show that young 
candidates can benefit more from a high attractiveness compared to their opponents than older 
candidates. 
5.2 Practical and normative implications 
We can conclude that for elections to the German Bundestag, with its comparatively low 
personalization and at the same time relatively high party identification which in principle 
should suppress effects of candidates’ physical appearance, beauty nevertheless “pays” and is 
never “beastly”. To a somewhat lesser extent, the same is true for perceived competence. 
Particularly for challengers and young politicians their physical appearance is a factor they 
themselves as well as the parties nominating them can hardly neglect in the tough fight for the 
first vote. Our study nevertheless also shows that while appearance matters, it is not 
everything – other factors such as incumbency status or the share of second votes influence 
electoral success to a bigger extent – yet, particularly in tight races, visual appearance can 
make the difference.  For candidates themselves it certainly matters that their facial attributes 
may help or hinder being perceived as attractive, competent or likable and that these 
perceptions have an impact on their chances of success at the ballot box. Candidates aware of 
the mechanism could actively try to shape their appearance with an eye towards polls, and, 
ultimately, electoral results (e.g. if their competence rating is low they could start to wear 
glasses, or they could grow a beard to become more attractive). As long as the consequences 
of the effects we found are such simple modifications of the appearances and looks of a 
candidate, this probably does not present a major problem from the point of democratic 
theory. There really is no argument against presenting oneself in way that appeals to others – 
virtually everybody does so to some extent. Yet, the picture changes if parties used this 
information for establishing a candidate selection process that puts special emphasis on 
physical appearance to just gain that extra momentum at the ballot. Once actual qualification 
or ideological positions of the candidates run the risk of ending up in the backseat compared 
to outward appearance, we can expect to see effects on both the quality of the campaigns and 
the resulting selection of political elites. Campaigns that are all tinsel and glitter with 
candidates only selected because of their appearance will almost certainly take their toll on 
the confidence into the political system and its representatives as a central element of the 
democratic process. For Germany, it seems that at the moment this is not the case, yet 
mediatisation and personalization of politics well known from the United States are also on 
their way here and could lead to the impression of an increasing superficiality in the political 
arena. For future studies it could therefore be interesting to test whether there has been an 
increase in the effects of candidates’ appearances, and, whether age-, period-, or cohort effects 
play a role too. Another interesting question to focus on, based on the results from this study – 
which only tackled elections to the German Bundestag – could be to systematically compare 
appearance effects between different political systems and political cultures. For example: Is 
there a universal effect of attractiveness and competence on the chances to get elected, even if 
in different cultures different facial characteristics may shape the perception of being 
attractive or competent? While this study has shown the importance of dealing with physical 
appearance in election studies, these and other related questions surely deserve a more 
thorough inspection.     
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O1: Comparison between the appearance ratings of the Freiburg and Passau student raters 
 
  
O2: Comparison between male and female raters 
 
 
O3: Variable overview  
(all variables measure on the level of the electoral district) 
 
Variable operationalization min / max mean  (sd)  source 
For dummies: % of cases 
Dependent Variable Vote share winner – vote share runner up 0 / 51.4 17.577  (11.986) Electoral management body Germany (Bundeswahlleiter) 
Attractiveness Latency weighted mean of clicks for 
the winning candidate compared to 
the runner-up 
0 / 1 0.500 (0.295) 
Own online survey Competence 0 / 0.952 0.532 (0.182) 
Likability 0 / 0.956 0.509 (0.210) 
Incumbency_direct 
Three dummies indicating who of the 
candidates (if any) had won the direct 
constituency seat  
Incumbent _direct = … 
Winner 2013:  
Runner up 2013:  





Electoral management body Germany (Bundeswahlleiter) 
Incumbency_BT 
Four dummies indicating who of the 
candidates (if any) had been 
members of the German Bundestag 
in the legislative term 2009-2013 
Incumbent_BT = … 
Winner 2013: 
Runner up 2013: 
Both Winner and Runner up:  






Electoral management body Germany (Bundeswahlleiter) 
Gender Four dummies indicating the gender configuration of the race  
Winner / Runner up: 
♂ / ♂ 
♂ / ♀ 
♀ / ♂ 






Electoral management body Germany (Bundeswahlleiter) 
Age difference Age of the winner minus age of the runner up  -32 / 31 -0.398 (13.089) Candidates CVs  
Doctorate 
1: Only winner has a doctor’s degree 
0: Both candidates or none of them 
have a doctor’s degree 
-1: Only runner up has a doctor’s 
degree 
-1 / 1 0.046 (0.496) Candidates CVs  
Contested electoral district 
Dummy identifying districts that had 
been regarded as contested before 
the 2013 election 
21.24% http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundestagswahl-wackel-wahlkreise-2013-a-916641.html (last 05.05.2015) 
Second votes 2013 
Second votes for party of the winner 
minus second votes for the party of 
the runner up (in %) 
-10.353 / 43.580 16.159 (11.214) Electoral management body Germany (Bundeswahlleiter) 
Turnout In % 58.9 / 79.8 71.378 (3.898) Electoral management body Germany (Bundeswahlleiter) 
Business tax revenues In 1000 Euro per capita 0.149 / 1.803 0.479 (0.274) Federal Statistical Office Germany 
Business registrations/ 
deregistrations Per 1000 persons -3.3 / 4.7 1.195 (1.243) Federal Statistical Office Germany 
Unemployment rate In % 2.0 / 14.0 6.763 (2.935) Federal Statistical Office Germany 
Percentage male population In % 46.644 / 51.657 49.179 (0.649) Federal Statistical Office Germany 
Senior-to-youth-rate 
Share of seniors (> 60)
Share of youth (<25)  
0.657 / 1.861 1.128 (0.220) Federal Statistical Office Germany 
O4: Main models with influential cases excluded 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  (stepwise)  (stepwise) 
     
Perceived physical appearance     
Attractiveness 2.987*** 3.127*** 2.755*** 2.820*** 
 (0.710) (0.580) (0.710) (0.570) 
Competence 0.566  0.661  
 (0.989)  (0.993)  
Likability 0.602  0.709  
 (0.846)  (0.845)  
Incumbency dummies     
Incumbency_BT (only runner up)   -4.220*** -3.389*** 
   (0.597) (0.523) 
Incumbency_BT (both cand.)   -2.529*** -2.010*** 
   (0.389) (0.404) 
Incumbency_BT (none of the cand.)   -2.398*** -2.198*** 
   (0.441) (0.402) 
Incumbency_direct (runner up) -4.250*** -3.939***   
 (0.660) (0.729)   
Incumbency_direct (none of the cand.) -1.704*** -1.702***   
 (0.387) (0.381)   
Gender dummies     
Winner: male & Runner up: male 2.189*** 1.271* 2.347***  
 (0.668) (0.656) (0.675)  
Winner: male & Runner up: female 2.808*** 2.154*** 2.664*** 0.876*** 
 (0.739) (0.713) (0.742) (0.336) 
Winner: female & Runner up: male 3.621*** 2.350*** 2.811*** 0.991** 
 (0.743) (0.743) (0.741) (0.485) 
Controls     
Age difference  -0.00607  -0.0263*  
 (0.0146)  (0.0146)  
Doctorate 0.412  0.451 0.553* 
 (0.309)  (0.309) (0.323) 
Contested electoral district -2.361*** -2.287*** -2.739*** -2.430*** 
 (0.420) (0.420) (0.408) (0.433) 
Second votes 2013 1.020*** 1.007*** 1.010*** 1.005*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0149) (0.0194) (0.0159) 
Turnout -0.0744  -0.0832  
 (0.0538)  (0.0529)  
Business tax revenues  -0.423  0.0505  
(in 1000 Euro per capita) (0.690)  (0.657)  
Business registrations/deregistrations  -0.00297  -0.0195  
(per 1000 persons) (0.151)  (0.151)  
Unemployment rate 0.0772  0.0941  
 (0.0852)  (0.0862)  
Percentage male population -0.436  -0.179  
 (0.280)  (0.280)  
Senior-to-youth-rate -2.686*** -1.558** -1.828* -1.334** 
 (1.018) (0.740) (1.015) (0.653) 
Constant 27.27* 1.153 14.94 2.755*** 
 (16.18) (1.230) (15.98) (0.941) 
     
Observations 238 241 242 242 
R-squared 0.966 0.962 0.966 0.964 
To test whether the most influential cases alter the main effects, all cases with a Cook’s distance greater than 4/N 
were excluded from the models (see Stata 2013: 1881). Standard errors in parentheses (Models 1 and 2 with 
robust standard errors due to heteroscedasticity) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
O5: Main models with betas 
 Model 1 Beta Model 2 Beta Model 3 Beta Model 4 Beta 
     
Perceived physical appearance     
Attractiveness 0.0592*** 0.0538*** 0.0668*** 0.0826*** 
Competence 0.0224 0.0313** 0.0327*  
Likability 0.0155  0.0153  
Incumbency Dummies     
Incumbency_BT (only runner up) -0.118*** -0.112***   
Incumbency_BT (both cand.) -0.0893*** -0.0908***   
Incumbency_BT (none of the cand.) -0.0714*** -0.0649***   
Incumbency_direct (runner up)   -0.0835*** -0.0822*** 
Incumbency_direct (none of the cand.)   -0.0665*** -0.0592*** 
Gender dummies     
Winner: male & runner up: male 0.0475  0.0496  
Winner: male & runner up: female 0.0624*  0.0700* 0.0343* 
Winner: female & runner up: male  0.0376  0.0464  
Controls     
Age difference -0.0354* -0.0382** -0.0217  
Doctorate 0.0114  0.00357  
Contested electoral district -0.0853*** -0.0872*** -0.0839*** -0.0787*** 
Second votes 2013 0.913*** 0.918*** 0.910*** 0.918*** 
Turnout -0.0337  -0.0359  
Business tax revenues (in 1000 Euro per capita) 0.00632  0.00583  
Business registrations/deregistrations (per 1000 persons) -0.00534  -0.00230  
Unemployment rate -0.0176  -0.0182  
Percentage male population -0.0286  -0.0292  
Senior-to-youth-rate -0.0351 -0.0296* -0.0470** -0.0369** 
     
Observations 259 259 259 259 
R-squared 0.947 0.945 0.941 0.938 
Normalized beta coefficients 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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O6: Interaction Models 
 
 Int. Model 1 Int. Model 2 Int. Model 3 Int. Model 4 Int. Model 5 Int. Model 6 Int. Model 7 Int. Model 8 Int. Model 9 
















Age x  
likability 
          
          
Perceived physical appearance          
Attractiveness 1.425 2.454*** 2.422*** 2.559** 2.371*** 2.485*** 2.301*** 2.427*** 2.424*** 
 (1.042) (0.865) (0.864) (0.996) (0.865) (0.865) (0.861) (0.862) (0.859) 
Competence 1.181 0.961 1.344 1.525 -0.0197 1.699 1.624 1.436 1.588 
 (1.205) (1.495) (1.201) (1.225) (1.529) (1.204) (1.202) (1.204) (1.202) 
Likability 0.986 0.818 -0.241 0.875 0.760 1.156 0.960 0.925 0.873 
 (1.040) (1.042) (1.296) (1.046) (1.039) (1.385) (1.035) (1.042) (1.035) 
Incumbency dummies          
Incumbency_BT (runner up) -7.001*** -4.326** -7.640*** -4.703*** -4.598*** -4.704*** -4.659*** -4.665*** -4.713*** 
 (1.338) (1.957) (1.994) (0.674) (0.672) (0.665) (0.668) (0.672) (0.668) 
Incumbency_BT (none of the cand.) -2.660** -3.953** -1.825 -2.278*** -2.317*** -2.091*** -2.272*** -2.263*** -2.279*** 
 (1.130) (1.806) (1.385) (0.545) (0.549) (0.545) (0.540) (0.543) (0.541) 
Incumbency_BT (both cand.) -3.546*** -3.073** -4.889*** -2.538*** -2.560*** -2.387*** -2.522*** -2.541*** -2.502*** 
 (0.884) (1.424) (1.231) (0.478) (0.475) (0.475) (0.474) (0.476) (0.475) 
Gender dummies          
Winner: female & Runner up: female -1.218 -1.201 -1.428* -0.929 -1.505 -6.379** -1.135 -1.152 -1.181 
 (0.780) (0.787) (0.782) (2.448) (2.190) (2.540) (0.778) (0.782) (0.780) 
Winner: male & Runner up: female 0.500 0.415 0.394 0.705 -1.440 1.187 0.458 0.446 0.431 
 (0.449) (0.451) (0.450) (0.790) (1.482) (1.062) (0.447) (0.449) (0.448) 
Winner: female & Runner up: male 0.237 0.0620 0.179 0.183 -1.763 1.971 0.291 0.185 0.220 
 (0.596) (0.615) (0.597) (1.684) (1.610) (1.760) (0.599) (0.601) (0.596) 
Controls          
Age difference -0.0310* -0.0334* -0.0323* -0.0333* -0.0314* -0.0319* 0.000623 -0.0154 0.00916 
 (0.0175) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0303) (0.0440) (0.0404) 
Doctorate 0.320 0.289 0.223 0.254 0.225 0.226 0.281 0.293 0.236 
 (0.382) (0.382) (0.377) (0.390) (0.381) (0.379) (0.379) (0.382) (0.380) 
Contested electoral districs -2.597*** -2.476*** -2.549*** -2.474*** -2.507*** -2.528*** -2.496*** -2.494*** -2.463*** 
 (0.487) (0.487) (0.483) (0.491) (0.486) (0.482) (0.483) (0.485) (0.484) 
Second votes 2013 0.979*** 0.973*** 0.968*** 0.975*** 0.972*** 0.976*** 0.976*** 0.975*** 0.973*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0224) 
Turnout -0.107* -0.106* -0.119* -0.106 -0.103 -0.0870 -0.0934 -0.105 -0.102 
 (0.0640) (0.0645) (0.0640) (0.0651) (0.0648) (0.0640) (0.0645) (0.0644) (0.0641) 
Business tax revenues (per capita) 0.368 0.299 0.376 0.287 0.336 0.498 0.379 0.281 0.265 
 (0.810) (0.816) (0.811) (0.818) (0.820) (0.812) (0.814) (0.813) (0.811) 
Business registrations/deregistrations -0.0213 -0.0748 -0.0680 -0.0488 -0.0272 -0.0732 -0.0407 -0.0526 -0.0359 
(per 1000 persons) (0.181) (0.182) (0.179) (0.181) (0.181) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) 
Unemployment rate -0.0549 -0.0833 -0.0826 -0.0719 -0.0735 -0.0557 -0.0601 -0.0763 -0.0682 
 (0.103) (0.104) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
Percentage male population -0.541 -0.493 -0.603* -0.530 -0.530 -0.502 -0.519 -0.535 -0.552* 
 (0.331) (0.335) (0.331) (0.335) (0.334) (0.330) (0.331) (0.333) (0.332) 
Senior-to-youth-rate -1.875 -1.842 -2.046* -1.928 -1.762 -1.919 -1.883 -1.915 -1.826 
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 (1.208) (1.224) (1.204) (1.223) (1.217) (1.213) (1.211) (1.215) (1.214) 
Interactions incumbency_BT          
Incumbency_BT (runner up) x  4.361**         
attractiveness (2.165)         
Incumbency_BT (none of the cand.) x  0.739         
attractiveness (1.783)         
Incumbency_BT (both cand.) x  2.134         
attractiveness (1.612)         
Incumbency_BT (runner up) x   -0.847        
competence  (3.636)        
Incumbency_BT (none of the cand.) x  3.377        
competence  (3.436)        
Incumbency_BT (both cand.) x  0.955        
competence  (2.556)        
Incumbency_BT (runner up) x   5.406       
likability   (3.426)       
Incumbency_BT (none of the cand.) x   -0.754       
likability   (2.381)       
Incumbency_BT (both cand.) x   4.970**       
likability   (2.385)       
          
Interactions gender          
Winner: female & Runner up: female x    -0.338      
attractiveness    (3.155)      
Winner: male & Runner up: female x    -0.661      
attractiveness    (1.663)      
Winner: female & Runner up: male    0.00229      
attractiveness    (2.416)      
Winner: female & Runner up: female x     0.567     
competence     (4.453)     
Winner: male & Runner up: female x     3.402     
competence     (2.506)     
Winner: female & Runner up: male     3.951     
competence     (3.046)     
Winner: female & Runner up: female      8.180**    
likability      (3.862)    
Winner: male & Runner up: female      -1.599    
likability      (2.116)    
Winner: female & Runner up: male      -3.052    
likability      (2.879)    
          
Interactions age          
Age difference x        -0.0650   
attractiveness       (0.0487)   
Age difference x         -0.0311  
competence        (0.0739)  
Age difference x          -0.0773 
Likability         (0.0677) 
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Constant 38.32** 36.03* 42.93** 37.34* 37.92* 34.15* 35.65* 37.69* 38.05** 
 (19.10) (19.28) (19.14) (19.36) (19.34) (19.05) (19.14) (19.22) (19.14) 
          
Observations 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 
R-squared 0.948 0.947 0.948 0.947 0.947 0.948 0.947 0.947 0.947 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
